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Abstract—The electricity production and distribution is facing two major
changes. First, the production is shifting from classical energy sources
such as coal and nuclear power towards renewable resources such as
solar and wind. Secondly, the consumption in the low voltage grid is
expected to grow significantly due to expected introduction of electrical
vehicles. The first step towards more efficient operational capabilities
is to introduce an observability of the distribution system and allow
for leveraging the flexibility of end connection points with manageable
consumption, generation and storage capabilities. Thanks to the ad-
vanced measurement devices, management framework, and secure
communication infrastructure developed in the FP7 SUNSEED project,
the Distribution System Operator (DSO) now has full observability of
the energy flows at the medium/low voltage grid. Furthermore, the pro-
sumers are able to participate pro-actively and coordinate with the DSO
and other stakeholders in the grid. The monitoring and management
functionalities have strong requirements to the communication latency,
reliability and security. This paper presents novel solutions and analyses
of these aspects for the SUNSEED scenario, where the smart grid ICT
solutions are provided through shared cellular LTE networks.
Index Terms—smart grid, real-time monitoring, security architecture,
cellular networks, low latency, reliable communication.
1 INTRODUCTION
In industrialized countries typical consumers are ex-
pected to become electricity producers due to the on-
going widespread deployment of distributed genera-
tion and energy storage elements, commonly called
Distributed Energy Resources (DER). A consumer that
produces energy is called a prosumer. In addition to the
introduction of DERs, gradual replacement of conven-
tional internal combustion engine vehicles with Electrical
Vehicles (EVs) is expected in the near future, causing a
significant increase in the load on the power grid. By
using only conventional grid management systems the
electrical grid capacity is under question. Reinforcing the
grid all the way to the user is an option, though it is
expensive, especially when other more convenient and
cheaper alternatives are on the horizon. The shift from
a mainly unidirectional power flows towards a fully
bidirectional paradigm can be used as an advantage,
allowing installation of additional DERs within existing
infrastructure. However, this requires a precise monitor-
ing of the distribution grid that provides reliable and
accurate information on its status to enable dynamic grid
management of the future [1].
While the benefits and the necessity of a smart dis-
tribution grid are clear, the communication solution
supporting it is not straightforward. Today, Distribution
System Operators (DSOs) are increasingly using IEC
61850 based communications for high-level monitoring,
management and control on high-speed LAN/optical
fiber networks [2]. However, when the scope is extended
downwards to low voltage infrastructure, the availability
of such high-end communication solutions is usually not
anticipated. Within the SUNSEED project1, a promising
approach is considered where the already deployed cel-
lular networks (primarily LTE) are used to provide the
smart distribution grid communication infrastructure.
In this paper the focus is on the security framework
and network performance requirements to enable the
incorporation of various measurement and control de-
1. www.sunseed-fp7.eu
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2vices, which together allow for the establishment of
grid management services based on time and privacy
sensitive data.
The specific contributions of this paper relate to the
smart grid services introduced in the following section.
Thereafter, we present the requirements, design choices
and proposed solutions for the smart grid communi-
cation and security architecture. Next, we consider the
performance of shared cellular LTE networks as a part of
a smart grid system. Specifically, we study the achievable
latency and reliability of the LTE based smart grid
communication. Finally, we summarize our findings and
outline the future steps of the SUNSEED project, namely
with respect to the large scale field trial that will be
deployed until 4th quarter of 2016.
2 SMART GRID MANAGEMENT SERVICES
2.1 State Estimation
To achieve reliable and accurate knowledge on the
grid condition, the Distribution System State Estimation
(DSSE) is of key importance. The benefit of the state
estimation is that it can take into account all types of
available measurements, thus reducing the investment
costs into required measurement infrastructure. Further,
DSSE provides estimation of grid state also on the grid
nodes where measurement devices are not located. As
the measurement locations are placed all the way down
to the prosumer level, the shared cellular networks seem
to serve as an efficient and viable solution for communi-
cating between measurement devices and the back-end
system. In general the DSSE performance depends on
location density, type, accuracy, and reporting interval
of the available measurement infrastructure in the grid,
such as:
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are dedicated de-
vices with common time reference provided by a
very high precision clock, which allow for time-
synchronized phasor (that is, synchrophasor) esti-
mations at different locations. Combining high pre-
cision and high sampling rate (up to 50/60 Hz)
measurements of voltage or current phasors on all
3 phases from multiple PMUs allow for a compre-
hensive view on the state of the entire grid intercon-
nection. Fig. 1 depicts a fully embedded micro PMU
(µPMU) prototyped within the SUNSEED project
that enables 3-phase voltage/current synchrophasor
measurements at medium/low voltage of the dis-
tribution grid. Besides dedicated measurement cir-
cuitry and signal processing it also features a Linux-
enabled application processor, LTE, Ethernet and
low-power radio communication interfaces, secure
element, and a GPS-based reference clock.
Power Measurements and Control (PMC) devices
allow for 3-phase power quality measurements
(such as real/reactive/apparent power, frequency,
voltage, current, total harmonic distortion) and
control of end connection points (via on/off relays
or serial line protocol). Within the SUNSEED
project the devices were designed in exactly
the same form factor as the µPMU, reusing the
application and connectivity boards and introducing
a measurement and control board. A 1 s reporting
period was considered for devices deployed at
major grid buses and important prosumer locations
to support state estimation, while a request-
response mechanism was considered to support
Demand-Response services described in section 2.2.
Smart Meters (SMs) for standard billing measurement,
assumed to be deployed at each prosumer. Based on
1 min or 15 min reporting interval. In the future, the
SMs may be used for power measurements as well,
however this requires lower reporting intervals, e.g.,
down to 1 s like the PMC devices.
Regardless of the challenges that need to be addressed
the main benefits of making the grid highly observable
can be summarised as follows:
• Disturbances on lower voltage level can be locally
detected, cleared, and eliminated before they affect
other parts of the system.
• DSOs will be able to identify grid model deficits,
and allow them to construct accurate models suit-
able for detailed analysis and planning work.
• DSO will be able to analyse how installed and
planned generation will affect the grid, enabling
short, medium and long term planning.
• Continuous grid observation will pave the way for
the real-time grid control.
2.2 Demand-Response
The smart distribution grid enables advanced features in
demand monitoring, analysis and response. Importantly,
the monitoring and control activities will not only reside
in operation centers but can also be distributed across
the whole grid by enabling control of consumption
and production flexibility in consumer and prosumer
locations. Having both sides of the distribution grid
participating in demand-response can lead to a win-
win outcome. The DSO benefits from efficient network
control and the consumers benefit from optimised use of
energy. For example, consumers at the demand side will
be able to manage their own consumption by changing
the normal electricity consumption patterns over time.
Both centralised and decentralised approaches are seen
in the literature [3], [4]. Decentralised techniques usu-
ally have reduced computational complexity, however
undesired communication overhead may be expected.
We notice that the quality of service (QoS) requirement
for demand-response is relatively relaxed compared to
DSSE, with the measurements interarrival time in the
order of minutes to hours, and the data transmission
latency requirements around 1 s [5]. The communica-
tion burden can be further reduced with the use of
approximated information in the neighbourhood-wide
consumption scheduling as proposed in [6]. In this way,
3Fig. 1: Illustration of µPMU that has been developed for the SUNSEED project.
the scheduling is done by the individual consumers
while their actual consumption is observed by the SMs
and the PMC units.
3 COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY ARCHI-
TECTURE
The role of the security framework is to protect the smart
grid assets against unfriendly attacks. An assessment of
potential attacks scenarios has resulted in the identifica-
tion of four high level security objectives:
• Insure availability of the services offered by the
smart grid (resilience to cyberattacks to insure func-
tionality).
• Insure privacy of communications within the smart
grid (avoid spying).
• Prevent damage to equipment or infrastructures
(resilience to cyberattacks to insure equipment or
infrastructures safety).
• Avoid fraud (for specific equipment located in sub-
scribers premises).
The attacker profiles taken into account are typically:
• A cyberterrorist trying to gain information, disrupt
the functioning of the SUNSEED services or lead to
a malfunction of the infrastructures by compromis-
ing either a device, a communication link or a cloud
platform.
• A subscriber trying to alter the functioning of the
smart grid services to lower its costs or increase its
revenues.
The protection of data communications taking place
in the smart grid system is key to meet the security
objectives, and different levels of protection may coexist
at different levels of the communication protocol stack:
Network access level security targets the protection of
the access network. This includes for example the
use of SIM cards to authenticate with 3G or 4G
wireless networks but also the deployment of VPN,
firewalls, etc.
Transport level security primarily aims at protecting
point-to-point data communication between two
communicating nodes. With communications being
IP based, this type of data protection is largely
independent from the communication channel (3G,
4G, Wi-Fi, PLC, ...) and is in most cases focused on
protection of TCP communication.
Application level security addressing the protection of
the payload carrying the applications data as de-
scribed below.
From the security standpoint, the primary high level
goal of the architecture described here is to provide end-
to-end data protection at the transport level for commu-
nication between the monitoring devices and the various
smart grid applications and services that access this
data. End-to-end security in its simplest form consists
in implementing point-to-point security, typically at the
transport level for every segment in the communication
path from source to destination. Every such segment
is therefore protected using different credentials and a
rekeying operation is typically needed at each transiting
node, which should therefore be trusted. Optionally, it
should be possible to add an extra layer of security
enabling the ciphering of application data all the way
from source to destination (using a group traffic en-
cryption key). In this case the data will remain opaque
while moving through transit nodes, possibly reducing
the trust level required for these nodes.
Fig. 2 describes the proposed communication and
security architecture. Data originating from µPMU, PMC
or SM devices is published to a data sharing platform,
possibly transiting through a gateway or aggregator
using popular publish/subscribe protocols such as Ex-
tensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [7] or
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [8]. At
the other end of the chain, applications subscribe to the
published data to perform specific tasks upon receiving
the data.
Another security requirement addressed by this archi-
tecture relates to the capability to manage the authoriza-
tion rights defining how software entities may interact
and exchange data. For optimal consistency and to min-
imize the risk of security holes resulting from human
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Fig. 2: SUNSEED communication and security architecture.
errors, this is best achieved using a centralized man-
agement interface avoiding the need to configure access
rights in a disparate way in many different platforms.
On that aspect, the choice was made to use a standalone
authorization server supporting a delegated authoriza-
tion scheme. The implementation is based on the User-
Managed Access (UMA) [7] profile of the widely used
Oauth [7] protocol. The authorization server is, in this
context, the place holding the description of the access
control policies to all access controlled ”resources” in
the ecosystem. For example µPMU devices may publish
their data on specific information topics using the MQTT
protocol, and it is certainly necessary to define which
software entity may publish or subscribe on a specific
topic. The ”information topic” is then modeled as an
”access controlled resource”. The delegated authoriza-
tion scheme, insures a dynamic life cycle management
of the access controlled resources in the authorization
server, by enabling the resources’ servers (for example
the publish/subscribe brokers), in charge of enforcing
access control, to register and delegate the management
of access control for their resources to the authorization
server via the UMA REST API. This delegated authoriza-
tion scheme is one of the two main structural security
choices made in the proposed architecture. It opens
the possibility to achieve a centralized access control
management for resources located in many dispersed
heterogeneous platforms. As a result, client applications
need only to authenticate with the authorization server
to dynamically receive credentials granting them access
to multiple heterogeneous platforms. This results not
only in enhanced security, but also in a great simplifi-
cation of authentication and authorization management.
The Authorization rights granted to requesting clients
are negotiated using the Oauth protocol and material-
ized as etokens possibly carrying credentials. The idea
is to distribute dynamically to every client application
(located in the µPMU or PMC devices or in remote
cloud servers) the set of credentials required to perform
the tasks it should perform with a given work flow
scenario. For example, a client application implementing
a historical data archive may need to subscribe to the
µPMU information topics via the MQTT protocol and
then store the received data in an archival database.
This client application should then dynamically receive
credentials enabling both the reception of information
and its storage in the archival database.
Another structural security choice relates to the deci-
sion to protect the credentials stored in the µPMU and
PMC devices via the use of embedded secure elements,
similar to the ones used for manufacturing embedded
UICCs [9] in cellular IoT devices. Commercially avail-
able secure elements provide a credible protection for
credentials stored inside their memory, which are meant
5to be used in place and cannot be read back, thereby
significantly complicating the setup of attacks involving
credential stealing and/or device cloning.
The protection of communications relies upon the use
of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol involving
both Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) clients’ and servers’
certificates. Client certificates are dynamically generated
in an initial security bootstrapping process between the
µPMU and PMC devices and the authorization server.
On the device, the PKI private and public keys are
dynamically generated within the secure element. While
the public key is sent out and serves as the starting
point to generate the client certificate, the private key
will remain securely stored inside the secure element
which exposes an API, enabling clients to request the
on chip execution of cryptographic primitive operations
such as signing or ciphering.
In order to simplify deployment, secure elements are
pre-personalized at manufacturing time. Each of them
comes with a unique identifier (which is used also to
identify the device), and these identifiers are initially
provisioned in a secure element management platform
along with root secrets. No software, or configuration
operation needs to be performed when deploying the
secure elements. They are to be considered as any other
electronic component and just need to be soldered on the
circuit board of the devices to secure. A bootstrap pro-
cess will occur transparently upon the first connection of
the device to an IP network, resulting in the possibility to
remotely manage the credentials stored inside the secure
element from a remote web interface.
Finally, particular attention was given to ease the use
of the proposed security mechanisms by application de-
velopers that are often requesting simple to use security
solutions. They want reasonable assurance that their
application will provide robust data protection without
having to dive into the details of the cryptographic
operations. The use of TLS to protect data communi-
cations is a good example. TLS in its most common
implementation involves the use of server certificates,
enabling servers to be authenticated by clients. Clients
may also be authenticated using client certificates, but
the complexity involved in generating and distributing
those has greatly limited the use of such authentication
methods. A very common demand from application
developers is to simplify the process of obtaining the
credentials they need, whatever their form. In many
cases, those credentials themselves are not even handled
in the developer’s code, but rather passed to third party
libraries or modules that the developer may be using.
In addition to ensuring the security of communicated
information in the smart grid, another cornerstone is to
ensure reliable and timely delivery of the information
through the used cellular networks, which is considered
in the following section.
4 CELLULAR NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The existing LTE cellular networks carry various types
of traffic, e.g. mobile broadband traffic, and are expected
to additionally serve the traffic originated by many IoT
applications including the smart grid applications such
as DSSE and demand-response. In this section the focus
is on the uplink of LTE cellular network that carries the
reports from the installed measurement devices (µPMU,
PMC, and SM) towards the publish-subscriber servers.
When the (shared) existing LTE cellular networks are
used to facilitate this measurement collection, from a
communication performance point of view there are two
possible bottlenecks that can have detrimental effects:
(a) The bottleneck in the random access phase, i.e. when
a large number of smart grid devices would like
to randomly or periodically transmit their measure-
ment reports. Here, each device needs to go through
the steps in the Access Reservation Protocol (ARP).
Due to the large number of smart grid and non-
smart grid devices within the LTE cell, the random
access attempts to set-up the individual connections
might collide resulting in failed random access at-
tempts.
(b) The bottleneck in the communication phase (that is,
after successfully finishing the random access phase)
when a large number of smart grid devices would
like to push their measurement data towards smart
grid applications. Since many uplink messages are
contending for the limited LTE uplink resources
the maximum delay that some measurement reports
might experience (for example due to the waiting
time until a device is granted an UL transmission
resource) could exceed the requirements of smart
grid applications such as DSSE.
In the following section we analyse the achievable
LTE uplink delay of SM, PMC and µPMU devices.
Hereafter, we consider specifically the bottlenecks in
the random access phase and describe a proposal for
ensuring reliable random access. The analyses are based
on simulation models described in references [10], [11],
[12].
In particular, we investigate and quantify the perfor-
mance of LTE for different possible deployment scenar-
ios in terms of the number of devices, their type, and the
amount of reserved LTE uplink physical radio resources,
as configured by the LTE cellular network operator for
supporting the smart grid data traffic. For the following
studies, we consider the ratio R between the number of
µPMU devices over the number of PMC/SM devices.
The PMC and SM devices are considered jointly, since
their uplink traffic patterns are similar. We consider
ratios of R=1/10 and R=1/3, where the former represents
a scenario with moderate DER penetration where not
too many µPMU devices are needed, whereas the latter
represents a heavy DER penetration. The measurement
report sizes from the PMC/SM and µPMU devices are
assumed to be 70 Bytes and 560 Bytes, respectively, as
6the µPMU devices report more detailed power measure-
ments. We assume that the reporting interval of all types
of measurement reports is 1 s, as motivated in sec. 2.
4.1 Max Uplink LTE Delay for Smart Grid Data Traffic
The analysis in this section is focused on the radio
part of the LTE uplink transmission, i.e., between the
end-node and the LTE base station. This is because it
is assumed that this is the most critical part of the
end-to-end path between the measurement device and
the smart-grid publish-subscribe server and applications,
which are typically connected through high-speed net-
work infrastructure as indicated in Fig. 2.
In LTE the uplink radio resources are organized
in time-frequency blocks, also called physical resource
blocks (PRBs), with duration of 0.5 ms and 12 consecu-
tive OFDMA frequency sub-carriers. The shortest uplink
radio transmission duration is 1 ms, also known as
Transmission Time Interval (TTI), which consists of two
consecutive PRBs in the time domain. The PRB allocation
per individual device and per TTI (or per block of
TTIs) is done by the scheduler located in the eNB. The
assumed scheduling approach for this analysis is fair
fixed assignment (FFA) [13] where in every TTI a device
is randomly selected from a number of devices willing to
transmit and it is allocated a fixed number of PRBs per
device. Depending on the signal-to-Interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) as experienced by the device on the
allocated PRBs an appropriate modulation and coding
scheme is selected for the transmission. This, in turn
determines the amount of data (in bits) that can be
transferred, and finally the number of TTIs needed to
transmit the measurement report by the devices. Addi-
tionally, as there is a limited number of reserved uplink
LTE radio resources (such as a limited total number of
PRBs) for the transmission of the measurement reports,
not all active devices in the LTE cell can begin their
transmission within one TTI. As a consequence, a num-
ber of active devices have to wait until they receive an
uplink transmission grant, resulting in a certain amount
of waiting time. Then the maximum uplink LTE delay is
the sum of the transmission time and the waiting time.
For more details regarding the analysis of the maximum
uplink LTE delay the reader is referred to reference [10].
In order to quantify the maximum LTE uplink delay,
monte-carlo system level simulations were performed
for an urban environment with increased number of total
smart grid devices per LTE cell.
In Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b the maximum LTE delay results
are presented for R=1/10 and R=1/3, respectively, for
fixed number of 2 PRBs assigned per device. It can be
seen that even for very small total number of devices the
maximum uplink LTE delay is about 20 ms and 200 ms,
respectively. This is the intrinsic delay of transmitting the
measurement report (including any re-transmissions),
since for low number of devices the waiting time is
practically zero.
As the number of devices increases, the maximum
uplink delay remains constant with zero waiting time,
only for when the whole bandwidth (10 MHz or 50 PRBs
in this case) is reserved for the smart grid data. As the
number of available PRBs is decreased to 20 or 6 PRBs,
which is more realistic in shared networks, the max delay
rapidly increases due to the waiting time incurred at
the devices until they get a scheduling grant for uplink
transmission. The only exception here is the max delay
for the µPMU in Fig. 3a where the max delays for 50
PRBs and 20 PRBs are equal and stays constant up to
4000 devices per LTE cell (i.e. these two curves overlap).
If the maximum delay requirement for the real-time
application is for instance 1 s then in order to achieve
this requirement for e.g. up to 4000 devices per LTE cell,
the operator is required to reserve 50 PRBs (or a whole 10
MHz LTE carrier), which might not be an economically
viable solution. For a more realistic amount of reserved
resources (for example 6 PRBs) the achievable maximum
delay is 6s or 3s for R=1/3 or R=1/10, respectively.
4.2 Guaranteed Reliability of Random Access in LTE
When a measurement device wants to transmit a report,
it will need to change state from idle to connected in the
LTE network, through the ARP [14]. This procedure has
several steps in which failures can occur, especially in
case of preamble collisions [12]. The collision probability
increases with the number of active devices [11]. This
means that in a traditional LTE network, a large number
of accessing devices can cause unacceptable delays for
the mission critical traffic of DSSE and demand-response
applications, where certain reliability requirements exist.
Since all random access requests are treated equally in
legacy LTE, there is no way to favorise certain types of
traffic.
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Fig. 4: Proposed contention frame layout for µPMU,
PMC/SM and best effort traffic.
For mission critical traffic, we propose an alternative
approach to random access in LTE, which allows to
reserve sufficient Random Access Opportunitys (RAOs)
to ensure a certain level of success probability (reliability)
in the random access procedure [11]. Instead of serving
all accessing devices equally, as in the legacy LTE ARP,
the modified approach that is described in detail in
reference [11] allows to create prioritized traffic classes
for which the probability of successfully accessing the
network can be guaranteed. The principle of this ap-
proach is illustrated in Fig. 4, where the prioritized
traffic classes µPMU, PMC/SM and Best Effort (ordered
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by most important first) that are relevant for the con-
sidered smart grid communication system are shown.
Each of the µPMU and PMC/SM traffic classes have
a dedicated Estimation Slot in the Contention Frame,
in which the corresponding devices must activate a
random preamble to access the network. This enables
the eNodeB to estimate the number of accessing devices
and to dimension the following serving phases to satisfy
the required reliability. Next, the devices will activate
a preamble randomly within the corresponding serving
phase, to start the ARP. Any remaining RAOs in the
contention frame will be available for best effort traffic.
The duration of the contention frame is set as half of the
shortest latency deadline, to ensure that the all deadlines
can be fulfilled.
The allocation of resources for increasing number of
µPMU and PMC/SM devices in an LTE cell is shown
in Fig. 5a. The plot shows that as the number of active
devices increases, first the RAOs available for best effort
traffic run out. Hereafter, the RAOs for PMC/SM traffic
are sacrificed to favorise the more important µPMU
traffic. Finally, the total number of devices becomes too
large to also support µPMU traffic.
For comparison, in Fig. 5b we show the achievable
reliability of the legacy LTE ARP, calculated using the
collision probability model in reference [12]. Assuming
that the arrival of µPMU and PMC/SM traffic occurs in a
traditional best effort manner, the reliability of all traffic
in legacy LTE will drop below the required reliability of
both µPMU and PMC/SM, at an earlier point than with
our proposed scheme. Notice that the required reliability
of µPMU can be supported with the proposed scheme
for 3 times as many active devices as legacy LTE for
the R=1/10 scenario. This does not hold for the R=1/3
scenario where a larger fraction of devices require 99.9%
reliability, since it requires more RAOs to ensure 99.9%
reliability than 95% reliability.
Unfortunately, the proposed scheme for guaranteed re-
liability random access cannot be easily implemented in
today’s cellular networks, since it requires changes to the
LTE protocol in both devices and eNodeB. The scheme
may, however, inspire the development of Machine Type
Communication (MTC) protocols for the upcoming 5G
standards.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STEPS
With the increasing penetration of Distributed Energy
Resources (DER) the smart grid needs more and deeper
monitoring and control to maintain stable operation.
In this paper, we have considered shared cellular LTE
networks as the underlying ICT infrastructure to support
the smart grid. Specifically, we highlighted the security
and communication requirements such as for example
end-to-end security, dynamic credential distribution, and
highly reliable low latency uplink communication. Fur-
ther, we outlined the solutions that were considered in
the SUNSEED project for tackling the communication
related challenges of ensuring successful operation of the
future smart grids.
In the last year of the SUNSEED project (until Jan.
31st, 2017) the suitability of the LTE cellular network
for facilitating the smart grid monitoring and control
functions will be tested via a large field trial in Slovenia
consisting of four planned areas with total number of
42 µPMU devices, 5 PMC devices, 22 PLC concentrators
and 563 SMs as follows:
Kromberk area with LTE coverage of 10 µPMU devices,
1 PMC device, 6 PLC concentrators and 116 SMs.
Bonifika area with LTE coverage of 7 µPMU devices, 2
PMC devices, 5 PLC concentrators and 535 SMs.
Razdrto area with UMTS coverage (due to lack of LTE
coverage) of 17 µPMU devices, 2 PMC devices, 7
PLC concentrators and 10 SMs.
Kneza area as illustrated in Fig. 6 with LTE coverage
of 3 µPMU devices and 2 PLC concentrators as
well as satellite links (due to lack of coverage of
any cellular network in this mountainous region)
covering 5 µPMU devices, 2 PLC concentrators and
2 SMs.
For more details, the reader is referred to the project
deliverables available via the project web-page at: www.
sunseed-fp7.eu.
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Fig. 5: Assumptions for result plots: 12 preambles, 1 s interval and 1 s latency deadline for both µPMU and PMC/SM.
Reliability: µPMU=99.9%, PMC/SM=95%.
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